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Abstract
Wikipedia is a prime example of today’s value production in a collaborative
environment. Using this example, we model the emergence, persistence and
resolution of severe conﬂicts during collaboration by coupling opinion formation
with article editing in a bounded conﬁdence dynamics. The complex social behavior
involved in editing articles is implemented as a minimal model with two basic
elements; (i) individuals interact directly to share information and convince each
other, and (ii) they edit a common medium to establish their own opinions. Opinions
of the editors and that represented by the article are characterised by a scalar variable.
When the pool of editors is ﬁxed, three regimes can be distinguished: (a) a stable
mainstream article opinion is continuously contested by editors with extremist views
and there is slow convergence towards consensus, (b) the article oscillates between
editors with extremist views, reaching consensus relatively fast at one of the
extremes, and (c) the extremist editors are converted very fast to the mainstream
opinion and the article has an erratic evolution. When editors are renewed with a
certain rate, a dynamical transition occurs between diﬀerent kinds of edit wars, which
qualitatively reﬂect the dynamics of conﬂicts as observed in real Wikipedia data.
Keywords: social dynamics; mathematical modeling; peer-production; Wikipedia;
bounded conﬁdence; opinion dynamics; mass-collaboration; social conﬂict
1 Introduction
Cooperative societies are ubiquitous in nature [], yet the cooperation or the mutual as-
sistance between members of a society is also likely to generate conﬂicts []. Potential for
conﬂicts is commonplace even in insect species [] and so is conﬂictmanagement through
policing and negotiation in groups of primates [, ]. In human societies cooperation goes
further not only in its scale and range, but also in the available mechanisms to promote
conﬂict resolution [, ]. Collaborative and conﬂict-prone human endeavors are numer-
ous, including public policy-making in globalized societies [, ], open-source software
development [], teamwork in operating rooms [], and even long-term partnerships
[]. Moreover, information communication technology opens up entirely new ways of
collaboration. With such a diversity in system size and social interactions between indi-
viduals, it seems appropriate to study this phenomenon of social dynamics in the frame-
work of statistical physics [, ], an approach beneﬁting greatly from the availability of
large scale data on social interactions [, ].
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As a relevant example of conﬂicts in social cooperation we select Wikipedia (WP), an
intriguing example of value production in an online collaborative environment []. WP
is a free web-based encyclopedia project, where volunteering individuals collaboratively
write and edit articles about any topic they choose. The availability of virtually all data
concerning the visiting and editing of article pages provides a solid empirical basis for
investigating topics such as online content popularity [, ] and the role of opinion-
formation processes in a peer-production environment [].
The editing process in WP is usually peaceful and constructive, but some controversial
topics might give rise to extreme cases of disagreement over the contents of the articles,
with the editors repeatedly overriding each other’s contributions and making it harder
to reach consensus. These ‘edit wars’ (as they are commonly called) result from complex
online social dynamics, and recent studies [] have shown how to detect and classify
them, as well as how they are related to burstiness and what are their circadian patterns
in editing activity [].
Although collaborative behavior might appear without direct interactions between in-
dividuals, communication tends to have a positive eﬀect on cooperation and trust [].
Indeed, more immediate forms of communication (voice as opposed to text, for example)
have been seen to increase the level of cooperation in online environments []. In WP,
direct communication is implemented via ‘talk pages’, open forumswhere editors may dis-
cuss improvements over the contents of articles and exchange their related opinions [].
Discussions among editors are not mandatory [], but there is a signiﬁcant correlation
between talk page length and the likelihood of an edit war, indicating that many debates
happen in articles and talk pages, simultaneously [, ].
Overall, a minimal model aimed at reproducing the temporal evolution of a common
medium (i.e. a product collectively modiﬁed by a group of people, like an article in WP)
requires at least the following two ingredients:
(i) agent-agent dynamics: Individuals share their views and opinions about changes in
the article using an open channel accessible to all editors (the talk page or some
other means of communication), thus eﬀectively participating in an
opinion-formation process through information sharing.
(ii) agent-medium dynamics: Individuals edit the article if it does not properly
summarize their views on the subject, thus controlling the temporal evolution of the
article and coupling it to the opinion-formation mechanism.
We describe the opinion-formation process taking place in the talk page by means of
the well-known bounded conﬁdence mechanism ﬁrst introduced by Deﬀuant et al. [],
where real discussions take place only if the opinions of the people involved are suﬃ-
ciently close to each other. Conversely, we model article editing by an ‘inverse’ bounded
conﬁdence process, where individuals change the current state of the article only if it dif-
fers too much from their own opinions. Particularly, we focus our attention on how the
coupling between agent-agent and agent-medium interactions determines the nature of
the temporal evolution of an article. This we consider as a further step towards the theo-
retical characterization of conﬂict in social cooperative systems such as WP [].
The text is organized as follows: In Section  we introduce and discuss the model in
detail. In Section  we describe our results separately for the cases of a ﬁxed editor pool
and a pool with editor renewal, and ﬁnallymake a comparisonwith empirical observations
on WP conﬂicts. In Section  we present concluding remarks.
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2 Model
Let us ﬁrst assume that there is a system of N agents as potential editors for a collective
medium. The state of an individual i at time t is deﬁned by its scalar, continuous opinion
xi(t) ∈ [, ], while the medium is characterized by a certain value A(t) in that same inter-
val. The variable x represents the view and/or inclination of an agent concerning the topic
described by the commonmedium, while A is the particular position actually represented
by the medium.
Although it may seem too reductive to describe people’s perceptions by a scalar variable
x, many topics can actually be projected to a one-dimensional struggle between two ex-
treme, opposite options. In the Liancourt Rocks territorial dispute between South Korea
and Japan [], for example, the values x = ,  represent the extreme position of favoring
sovereignty of the islets for a particular country. Other topics are of course multifaceted,
generating discussions that depend on the global aﬃnity of individuals and multiple cul-
tural factors []. While this complexity could be tackled by the use of vectorial opinions
[, ], our intention here is not to describe extremism as realistically as possible, but to
study the rise of collaborative conﬂict even in the simplest case of binary extremism.
In the case of WP, the scalar variable A represents the opinion expressed by the written
contents of an article, which carries the assumption that all agents perceive themedium in
the sameway. Real scenarios of public opinionmight bemore complex, given the tendency
of individuals to attribute their own views to others and thus perceive false consensus
[], usually out of a social need to belong []. Even so, we consider A to be a sensible
description of a WP article, one that could initially be measured by human judgment in
the form of expert opinions, or in an automated way by quantifying lexical features and
the use of certain language constructs. We note, however, that the actual value of A is
not the main concern of our study. Instead, we are interested in how opinion diﬀerences
in collaborative groups may eventually lead to conﬂict, speciﬁcally when such opinion
diﬀerences are perceived with respect to a common medium that all individuals modify
collectively.
2.1 Agent-agent dynamics
For the agent-agent dynamics (AAD) we consider a generic bounded-conﬁdence model
over a complete graph [, ], that is, a succession of randombinary encounters among all
agents in the system. We initialize every opinion xi() to a uniformly-distributed random
value in the interval [, ]. The initial medium value A() is chosen uniformly at random
from the same interval. This way, even an initially moderate medium A ∼ / may ﬁnd
discord with extreme opinions at the boundaries. For each interaction we randomly select
two agents i, j and compare their opinions. If the diﬀerence in opinions exceeds a given
threshold T nothing happens, but if |xi – xj| < T we update as follows,
(xi,xj) →
(
xi +μT [xj – xi],xj +μT [xi – xj]
)
. ()
The parameter T ∈ [, ] is usually referred to as the conﬁdence or tolerance for pairwise
interactions, whileμT ∈ [, /] is a convergenceparameter. AAD is then a symmetric com-
promise between similarly-minded individuals: people with very diﬀerent opinions simply
do not pay attention to each other, but similar agents debate and converge their views by
the relative amount μT .
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The dynamics set by Eq. () has received a lot of attention in the past [], starting from
the mean-ﬁeld description of two-body inelastic collisions in granular gases [, ]. Its
ﬁnal, steady state is comprised by nc ∼ /(T ) isolated opinion groups that arise due to
the instability of the initial opinion distribution near the boundaries. Furthermore, nc in-
creases as T →  in a series of bifurcations []. In the limit μT →  corresponding to
a ‘stubborn’ society, the asymptotically ﬁnal value of nc also depends on μT [, ]. The
bounded-conﬁdence mechanism has been extended in many ways over the years, consid-
ering interactions between more than two agents [], vectorial opinions [, –], and
coupling with a constant external ﬁeld [].
2.2 Agent-medium dynamics
For the agent-medium dynamics (AMD) we use what could be thought of as an asym-
metric, inverse version of the bounded-conﬁdence mechanism described above. When
the opinion of a randomly chosen agent i is very diﬀerent from the current state of the
medium, namely if |xi –A| > A, we make the update,
A → A +μA[xi –A], ()
where A,μA ∈ [, ] are the tolerance and convergence parameters for AMD. In other
words, individuals that come across a version of the medium portraying a radically dif-
ferent set of mind will modify it by the relative amount μA, where the threshold to deﬁne
similarity is given by A. Conversely, if |xi –A| < A we update,
xi → xi +μA[A – xi] ()
meaning that individuals edit the medium when it diﬀers too much from their opinions,
but adopt the medium’s view when they already think similarly. Observe that the maxi-
mummeaningful value of μT is / (i.e. convergence to the average of opinions), while the
maximumμA =  implies changing themedium (opinion) so that it completely reﬂects the
agent’s (medium’s) point of view.
The previous rules comprise ourmodel for the dynamics of conﬂicts inWP given a ﬁxed
agent pool, that is, without agents entering or leaving the editing process of the common
medium. In a numerical implementation of the model, every time step t consists of N up-
dates of AAD given by Eq. () and of AMD following Eqs. () and (), so that time is eﬀec-
tively measured in number of edits and the broad inter-event time distribution between
successive edits (observed in empirical studies []) does not have to be considered di-
rectly. Given a ﬁxed agent pool, AAD favors opinion homogenization in intervals of length
T and can thus create several opinion groups for low tolerance, while AMD makes the
medium value follow themajority group. Then, for a ﬁnite system there is a nonzero prob-
ability that any agent outside themajority groupwill be drawn by themedium to it, and the
system will always reach consensus after a transient regime characterized by ﬂuctuations
in the medium value [].
However, in realWP articles the pool of editors tends to change frequently. Some editors
leave (due to boredom, lack of interest or fading media coverage on the subject, or are
banned from editing by editors at a higher hierarchical level) and newly arrived agents
do not necessarily share the opinions of their predecessors. Such feature of agent renewal
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during the process or writing an article may destroy consensus and lead to a steady state
of alternating conﬂict and consensus phases, which we take into account by introducing
thermal noise in the model. Along with any update of AAD/AMD, one editor might leave
the pool with probability pnew and be substituted by a new agent with opinion chosen
uniformly at random from the interval [, ]. The quantity /(Npnew) then formally acts
as the inverse temperature of the system, signaling a dynamical phase transition between
diﬀerent regimes of conﬂict [].
3 Results
3.1 Fixed agent pool
In the presence of a ﬁxed agent pool (pnew = ) with ﬁnite size N , the dynamics always
reaches a peaceful state where all agents’ opinions lie within the tolerance of the medium.
To show this, let us calculate the probability that an unsatisﬁed editor i changes the
medium A for n consecutive times, such that afterwards |xi – A′| < A and the agent can
ﬁnally stop its stream of edits. For ﬁxed xi and following Eq. (), the ﬁnal distance between
editor and medium is |xi – A′| = ( – μA)n|xi – A|, so the inequality |xi – A′| < A is satis-
ﬁed if n > ln A/ ln( –μA). The probability of agent i not participating in AAD for n time
steps is ( – /N)n, while the probability of choosing it for AMD is /Nn. Then the total
probability of this stream of edits is (–/N)n/Nn, which for largeN and μA ∼  might be
very small, but always ﬁnite. After editor i gets into the tolerance interval of the medium,
it will not perform additional edits and will eventually adopt the majority opinion close
to the medium value. Similar events with other unsatisﬁed agents will ﬁnally result in full
consensus and put an end to the dynamics.
The existence of a ﬁnite relaxation time τ to consensus (for ﬁnite systems) contrasts
drastically with the behavior of the bounded conﬁdence mechanism alone, where con-
sensus is never attained for T < / []. In other words, the presence of agent-medium
interactions promotes an agreement of opinions that would otherwise not exist in the
agent-agent dynamics, even though it may happen after a very long time (i.e. τ  ). If we
think of the medium as an additional agent with maximum tolerance (in the sense that it
always interacts with the rest no matter what) and against which agents have a diﬀerent
tolerance A (as opposed to T ), this result is reminiscent of previous observations for a
bounded-conﬁdence model with heterogeneous thresholds [, ]. There, even a small
fraction of ‘open-minded’ agents with relatively high tolerance may bridge the opinion
diﬀerence between the rest of the agents and lead to consensus.
In order to analyze all possible typical behaviors of the ﬁxed agent pool dynamics, we
perform extensive numerical simulations in systems of size ranging from N =  to ,
letting the dynamics evolve for a maximum time τmax = . We then characterize the
temporal evolution of medium and agent opinions as a function of T , A and μA, while
keeping pnew =  for all results in this section. Finally, since the value of μT has no major
eﬀect other than regulating the convergence time of AAD [, ], from now on we ﬁx it
to the maximum value μT = / in order to speed up the simulations as much as possible.
A sample time series ofmedium and agent opinions is shown in Figure . As a function of
the medium convergence μA the temporal evolution of the system shows three distinctive
behaviors. In regime IwhereμA is typically very small (Figure (A) and (D)), there is one or
more ‘mainstream’ opinion groups near x∼ / with amajority of the agents in the system,
and a number of smaller, ‘extremist’ opinion groups at positions closer to the boundaries
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Figure 1 Temporal evolution of opinions andmedium. (A, B, C) Time series of both the density
distribution P(x) of agents’ opinions x (color map) and the medium value A (line) for T = 0.2 and several μA
values, signaling the three diﬀerent regimes found in the dynamics. (D, E, F) The same but for T = 0.04.
Simulations correspond to A = 0.1 and N = 104.
x = , . The medium opinion stays on average at the center of the opinion space, close to
the mainstream group(s), and although continuously contested by editors with extremist
views, it remains stable and leads to a very slow convergence towards consensus. The
reason for a long relaxation time in regime I is intuitively clear: for low μA any change
in AMD is small and thus both medium and extremist opinions fail to converge quickly.
When the tolerance T decreases the eﬀect is evenmore striking; even though the number
of opinion groups is larger (according to the approximation nc ∼ /[T ]), the article is
quite stable and remains close to the mainstream view.
In regime II identiﬁed with intermediate values of μA (Figure (B) and (E)), the ﬁxed
pool dynamics produces quasi-periodic oscillations in the medium value A, which appear
after an initial stage of opinion group formation and end up very quickly in total consen-
sus. Quite surprisingly, the ﬁnal consensual opinion is not x∼ / (as in regime I) or that of
the initial mainstream group, but some intermediate value closer to the extremist groups
at the boundaries. This is indicative of a symmetry-breaking transition: as μA increases,
a symmetric stationary state at x ∼ / is replaced by a ﬁnal state close to  or . The os-
cillations in regime II can initially be understood as a struggle over medium dominance
among the diﬀerent opinion groups created by AAD. The AMD mechanism couples the
medium dynamics with these groups, exchanging agents between them and thus modify-
ing their positions, until the majority group wins over the rest and consensus is achieved.
For small T oscillations are more well-deﬁned and last for longer, while extremist groups
tend to diﬀuse towards the mainstream.
In regime III for large μA (Figure (C) and (F)), extremist agents directly converge to
a mainstream group and an article at the center. Since in this case μA is so large, after
any jump of the article extremist agents can enter its tolerance interval and start drift-
ing inwards. The limiting condition for this behavior is μA =  – A/(/ – A) [], a line
separating regime III from the rest. A smaller T value produces a more erratic medium
evolution, with occasional jumps up and down.
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Figure 2 Distributions of relaxation time. (A, B, C) Cumulative distribution Pc(τ ) of the relaxation time τ
necessary to reach consensus and thus end the dynamics, for diﬀerent values of the medium
convergence μA . Insets: Probability P(τ > τmax) that the relaxation time is larger than τmax = 104 (the
maximum time allowed in the numerical simulations), as a function of N for selected values of μA . The
symbols I, II and III denote the three diﬀerent regimes found in the dynamics. Simulations correspond to
T = 0.2, A = 0.1 and N = 104, with averages over 104 realizations.
The regimes of the ﬁxed agent pool dynamics can be quantiﬁed on average by taking a
look at the cumulative distribution Pc(τ ) of the relaxation time τ (Figure ). In regime I
the tail of Pc(τ ) is quite ﬂat, getting ﬂatter asμA decreases. In contrast, the distribution has
a power-law and an exponential tail in regimes II and III, respectively, signaling shorter
relaxation times. The only exception is the transition between II and III, where τ might be
as large as in I. Since Pc(τ ) tends to be broad, the average value of τ is not very meaningful
and we opt instead for the probability P(τ > τmax) that the relaxation time is larger than a
ﬁxed maximum time. Numerically, we estimate P(τ > τmax) as the fraction of realizations
of the dynamics that have not reached consensus after τmax time steps, out of a large total of
 realizations. In regimes II and III, P(τ > τmax) remains small asN increases, indicating
that τ is roughly independent of system size. On the other hand, P(τ > τmax) scales with
N for I and for the boundary between II and III, even reaching  for appropriate values
of μA and N . A corollary is that even modestly-sized systems may only reach consensus
after an astronomical time, if the medium convergence value is appropriate.
The transition between regimes becomes even clearer when we consider the eﬀect of
the medium tolerance A, resulting in a phase diagram for P(τ > τmax) in (A,μA) space
(Figure (A)). It turns out that regimes I and II cover most of the low A values, while the
lineμA = –A/(/–A) roughly signals the transition to regime III, which covers a broad
area of large A. As N increases, the transition to I from either II or III (Figure (B) and
(C)) becomes sharper: a consensual ﬁnal state reached after a very short time gives way
to a stationary state that remains stable for really long times. Such features of the phase
diagram remain qualitatively unchanged if we substitute P(τ > τmax) with anothermeasure
giving robust statistics, such as the median relaxation time of the dynamics.
Finally, we can consider the symmetry-breaking transition between regimes I and II by
taking a look at the density distribution P(A) of the ﬁnal medium value (Figure (A) and
(B)). After either τ or τmax has passed, the majority of opinions are in consensus with A,
making P(A) a good approximation for the ﬁnal opinion distributionP(x) aswell. In regime
I the medium distribution is roughly unimodal and peaked at A ∼ /, signaling a stable
and moderate medium. Here the relaxation time is quite long and for most realizations
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Figure 3 Phase diagram for a ﬁxed agent pool. (A) Phase diagram in (A ,μA) space of the probability
P(τ > τmax) that the relaxation time is larger than τmax = 104, in a system of size N = 104. Points give the
(A ,μA) values used in Figure 2, corresponding to regimes I, II and III. (B, C) Cross sections of the phase
diagram along the dashed lines in (A) for varying N. Simulations correspond to T = 0.2, with averages over
104 realizations.
Figure 4 Symmetry-breaking transition. (A, B) Distribution P(A) of the ﬁnal medium value A reached after
a time min(τ ,τmax) has elapsed, for varying N. The selected μA values represent regimes I (A) and II (B).
(C) Standard deviation σ (A) of the ﬁnal medium value as a function of μA , for several values of N. This order
parameter signals a symmetry-breaking transition between regimes I and II. Simulations correspond to
T = 0.2, A = 0.0375 and τmax = 104, with averages over 104 realizations.
τ > τmax. In regime II, however, P(A) becomes bimodal, meaning that the medium is more
likely to end up close to the extremes rather than in the center. When N is large, the main
peaks in P(A) correspond to consensual ﬁnal states with τ ≤ τmax, while the secondary
peaks are made up of long-lived realizations with long relaxation time. Larger values of
τmax, although computationally expensive, would therefore let us see a strictly bimodal
medium distribution for regime II. AsN increases the distribution peaks become sharper
and we can use the standard deviation σ (A) of the ﬁnal medium value as an order parame-
ter for the transition (Figure (C)). In the thermodynamic limitN → ∞, a vanishing σ (A)
for I implies a stationary stable state with A∼ / and no consensus. As μA increases this
symmetry gets broken, σ (A) becomes nonzero and a true ﬁnal state of consensus appears.
This symmetry-breaking mechanismmay be understood analytically via a rate equation
formalism []. The resulting rate equation can be solved numerically assuming three ed-
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itor groups: a mainstream at x∼ / and two extremists with opinions close to the bound-
aries. The solution shows stability for the medium at the mainstream opinion when μA is
small, but becomes unstable and oscillating for μA 
 A ±.. The bifurcation transition
is very sensitive on the position of the extremists, depending not only on (μA, A) but also
on the initial conditions. This is in part the cause of the ‘noisy’ landscape of regime II in
Figure (A), which appears regardless of the measure used to draw the phase diagram.
3.2 Agent renewal
In real systems the pool of collaborators is usually not ﬁxed: Editors come and go and very
often the number of editors ﬂuctuates in time as external events may incite more or less
attention. To keep things simple we only focus on systems with a ﬁxed number of editors
(N agents), but we allow agent replacement with probability pnew = . In our numerical
simulations this happens prior to editing, and new agents have initially random opinions
coming from a uniform distribution.
If A < / there is always an opinion range outside the article tolerance region [A – A,
A+ A] and new agents may enter such range and edit the article. FromWP data we know
that even peaceful articles have few disputes now and then so such a scenario is realistic.
This is thus in contrast with the case of a ﬁxed opinion pool, where consensus is theoret-
ically always achieved.
A stronger statement can be shown [], namely that if




then consensus is always reached after a ﬁnite number of steps, but if A < ∗A there are
realizations that do not reach consensus ever. We show here an example: if the medium
value is A = ∗A, then for A = ∗A – ε an editor at x =  will disagree with the article and
change it by  = ∗AμA, so the new medium value would be A =  – ∗A. Afterwards an
agent at x =  can restore the article to its previous state and avoid consensus.
The lack of full consensus does not mean that the system is always in a conﬂict state.
There are periods when A remains unchanged and these peaceful times are ended by con-
ﬂicts in which the opinion of the article is continuously disputed between agent groups of
diﬀerent opinion. If the dispute is settled (i.e. all agents are satisﬁed by the article) a new
peaceful periodmay start. The ratio of these peaceful and conﬂicting periods changes with
the parameters and may be considered as a good candidate for an order parameter. Thus
we deﬁne the order parameter P as the relative length of the peaceful periods.
The order parameter is plotted for two diﬀerent initial conditions in Figure . The top
ﬁgure shows the value of the order parameter P for a ‘peaceful’ initial condition when all
agents had the opinion xi = /. The bottom ﬁgure was instead obtained for a system with
‘conﬂict’ initial conditions, namely one with % of agents divided between two extremist
groups of opinions  and  (and the rest at xi = /) before the start of the dynamics.
It is clear that there are two distinct regimes in the phase diagram of Figure : one char-
acterized by P =  (‘peaceful’ regime), the other with P =  (‘conﬂict’ regime) and a sharp
transition in between. There is a region which is diﬀerent in the two cases and will be dis-
cussed later. We then identify the transition point with the largest gradient of P by using
the lower plot in Figure . The resulting phase diagram is shown in Figure .
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Figure 5 Order parameter for the agent renewal
case. Order parameter P as a function of the
medium tolerance A and the agent replacement
rate pnew for systems of size N = 80. The chosen
initial condition is consensus for the top diagram and
conﬂict for the bottom one.
Figure 6 Phase diagram for a systemwith agent
renewal. Largest gradient of P by using the lower
plot in Figure 5, for varying μA . Simulations
correspond to T = 0.2 and system size ranging from
N = 10 to 640. The article convergence parameter
was μA = 0.1, 0.2, 0.45, 0.7 for red, green, blue and
magenta respectively. The curved black line is the
analytical result for μA = 0.1. The horizontal line
limiting the prepetual peace domain is at A = 0.15.
The eternal peace is limited by ∗A (shown with
dashed lines for the same color) which depends
on μA .
Figure 7 Time evolution of opinions. Samples of medium/agent opinions as a function of time for
A = 0.42, and for three diﬀerent regimes represented by pnew = 0.001, 0.002, 0.003 (from left to right
respectively). Colour coding is as follows: Red points (opinion of the article), green dots (agents who are
satisﬁed with the article), blue points (agents whose opinion is outside the medium tolerance interval), and
light blue background (conﬂict regions).
This transition is further illustrated in Figure  where we display sample time evolutions
of the opinions of agents and medium. The left panel shows an example of a peaceful
regime.Asmentioned before, from time to timenewagents arrivewith incompatible views
with respect to the article but they are paciﬁed very fast, i.e. the conﬂict periods are short.
In the transition regime (middle panel) the scenario of peaceful times interrupted by short
conﬂicts is still observable, but periods of continuous conﬂict occasionally appear. In the
conﬂict regime exempliﬁed by the right panel, these conﬂict bursts become persistent and
the peaceful periods tend to disappear.
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The above transition is the result of a competition between two timescales. New agents
arrive outside of the article’s tolerance interval with an ‘insertion’ timescale τins ∝ Npnew.
In order to have P >  the conﬂicts must be resolved before a new extremist agent arrives.
Let us note that the convergence is very fast if there is only one extremist group. The
problem is solved by displacing the article opinion by the required amount, which can be
done in few (N independent) steps. This is what happens in the left panel of Figure . On
the other hand, if we have two extremist groups on both sides of the opinion interval the
relaxation is much slower and this is manifested in a much longer relaxation time. Thus,
at the transition the insertion timescale is equal to the relaxation time of the case with two
extremist groups, which is analogous to the ﬁxed agent pool version of the model.
The task here is to determine the relaxation time of the ﬁxed pool version of the model
and relate it to τins. For large values of themedium tolerance (A > /), the relaxation time
can by calculated analytically [],
τ (e) = c(μA)N
([
e + e(n – )
]
n – ee(n – )( + n)
)
, ()
where e = ∗A – A, e = ∗A – /, n denotes the integer part of e/e (which is actually the
number of steps the medium can make in one direction) and c is a constant depending
on μA.
The above approach works well for A > . and μA < . (regime III of the ﬁxed pool
case). If themainstream group gets dissatisﬁed either by the large jump (μA is too large) or
by the small tolerance (A too small) of the article, the reasoning presented in [] breaks
down and new eﬀect comes into play, namely the relaxation times of the ﬁxed pool system
becomes be enormous (regime I).
As we enter regime I of the ﬁxed pool dynamics the relaxation time increases sharply
(see Figure (B) and (C)). This means that if the system gets into a conﬂict state it will






This is why, starting from a conﬂict initial condition, the lower phase diagram in Figure 
shows P =  for A < .. On the other hand, in order to initiate such a conﬂict one needs
to have a situation where two extremists appear on both ends of the opinion space outside
of the article tolerance interval. If we have a single extremist then the consensus will be
reached within a few time steps, independently of N . So the probability that we create a
long-lasting conﬂict state decreases proportionally to the agent replacement probability.
This is why we see only peace on the ﬁnite-time realizations leading to the upper phase
diagram in Figure . Had we waited long enough, a conﬂict would have been formed for
A < / – T / and would have persisted further on.
In summary, the typical behavior of our model in the presence of agent renewal may be
divided into four distinct regimes:
(i) Eternal peace (A > ∗A): The system reaches consensus very fast and remains there
for ever.
(ii) Peace (A >  –
T
 and above the phase transition line): The system is mainly in a
consensual state and only interrupted by short disputes.
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(iii) War (A >  –
T
 and below the phase transition line): The system is mainly in a
state of disagreement.
(iv) Perpetual war (A <  –
T
 ): In this regime and in the thermodynamic limit
N → ∞ no consensus may exist.
3.3 The case of Wikipedia
Although themodel described and analyzed above is simpliﬁed enough to be extendable to
various cases of collaboration, we specially intend to use it to explain some of the empirical
observations regarding edit wars in WP.
Wikipedia is huge, not only in its number of articles and users but in the number of
times articles are edited. In most cases articles are not written in a collaborative way, i.e.,
they have single authors or a few authors who have written and edited diﬀerent parts of
the article without any signiﬁcant interaction []. In contrast, a few cases show signiﬁ-
cant constructive and/or destructive interactions between editors. The latter situation has
been named ‘edit war’ by the WP community and deﬁned as follows: “An edit war occurs
when editors who disagree about the content of a page repeatedly override each other’s
contributions, rather than trying to resolve the disagreement by discussion” [].
To start an empirical analysis of such opinion clashes and the way they are entangled
with collaboration, we need to be able to locate and quantify edit wars.
.. Controversy measure
An algorithm to quantify edit wars and measure the amount of social clashes forWP arti-
cles has been introduced and validated before [], and then used to study extensively the
dynamical aspects of WP conﬂicts []. An independent study [] has also shown that
this measure is among the most reliable in capturing very controversial articles.
We quantify the ‘controversiality’ of an article based on its edit history by focusing on
‘reverts’ (i.e. when an editor completely undoes another editor’s edit and brings the article
back to the state just before the last version). Reverts are detected by comparing all pairs
of revisions of an article throughout its history, namely by comparing the MD hash code
[] of the revisions. Speciﬁcally, a revert is detected when two versions in the history line
are exactly the same. In this case the latest edit (leading to the second identical revision)
is marked as a revert, and a pair of editors, referred to as reverting and reverted editors,
are recognized.
Very soon in our investigation we noticed that reverts can have diﬀerent reasons and
not in all cases signalize a conﬂict of opinions. For example, an editor could revert per-
sonal edit mistakes or someone else’s. Reverts are also heavily used to suppress vandalism,
in itself a diﬀerent type of destructive social behavior, but with no collaborative intention
and therefore out of our interest. Thus we narrowed down our analysis to ‘mutual reverts’.
A mutual revert is recognized if a pair of editors (x, y) is observed once with x as the re-
verter and once with y. We also noticed that mutual reverts between pairs of editors at
diﬀerent levels of expertise and experience in WP editing could contribute diﬀerently to
an edit war. Two experienced editors getting involved in a series of mutual reverts is usu-
ally a sign of a more serious conﬂict, as opposed to the case when two newbies or a senior
editor and a newbie bite each other []. As a solution we introduced a ‘weight’ for each
editor, and to sum up all reverts within the history of an article we counted each revert
by using the smaller weight of the pair of editors involved in it. The weight of an editor x
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is deﬁned as the number of edits performed by him or her, and the weight of a mutually
reverting pair is deﬁned as the minimum of the weights of the two editors. The contro-
versialityM of an article is then deﬁned by summing the weights of all mutually reverting










where N r, Nd are the number of edits for the article committed by the reverting/reverted
editor. This measure can be easily calculated for each article, irrespective of the language,
size, and length of its history.
Before starting our discussion about the empirical dynamics of conﬂict and its compar-
ison with theoretical results, a remark on the most controversial articles in WP. We have
calculatedM for all articles in  diﬀerent languages, from the start of each language WP
up to March . In Table  we show the list of the top- most controversial articles.
A more complete and detailed analysis of the lists of the most controversialWP articles in
diﬀerent languages and diﬀerences and similarities between them can be found elsewhere
[].
.. Dynamics of conﬂict and war scenarios
Measuring M can not only lead us to rank the articles based on their cumulative con-
troversy measure, but also enables us to follow edit wars in time as they emerge and get
resolved, by investigating the evolution of M as time passes and the article develops. In
the top row of Figure  we show the time evolution of M for three diﬀerent sample arti-
cles.
Based on the wayM evolves in time, we may categorize almost all controversial articles
into three categories:
(i) Single war to consensus: In most cases controversial articles can be included in this
category. A single edit war emerges and reaches consensus after a while, stabilizing
quickly. If the topic of the article is not particularly dynamic, the reached consensus
holds for a long period of time (top left in Figure ).
(ii) Multiple war-peace cycles: In cases where the topic of the article is dynamic but the
rate of new events (or production of new information) is not higher than the pace
to reach consensus, multiple cycles of war and peace may appear (top center in
Figure ).
(iii) Never-ending wars: Finally, when the topic of the article is greatly contested in the
real world and there is a constant stream of new events associated with the subject,
the article tends not to reach a consensus andM increases monotonically and
without interruption (top right in Figure ).
The empirical war scenarios described previously are in qualitative agreement with the
theoretical regimes of ourmodel in the case of agent renewal, as seen fromboth the sample
time series in Figure  and the regimes of war and peace in the phase diagrams of Figure 
and Figure . Unfortunately, the theoretical order parameter P is quite diﬃcult tomeasure
in real systems as editor opinions are not known.What we know instead is the controversy
measureM of Eq. (). As mentioned before,M counts conﬂict events (i.e. mutual reverts)
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Figure 8 War scenarios for WP and our model. Top: Empirical controversy measure M as a function of the
number of article edits in three diﬀerent war scenarios. From left to right, sample articles are ‘Jyllands-Posten
Muhammad cartoons controversy’, ‘Iran’, and ‘Barack Obama’; and correspond to the regimes of ‘single war’,
‘war-peace cycles’, and ‘never-ending war’ respectively. Bottom: Theoretical conﬂict measure S in the case of
agent renewal, reproducing the qualitatively analogue evolution of WP articles with parameter values
N = 640, T = 0.2 and μA = 0.1, as well as A = 0.35, 0.42, 0.30 and pnew = 0.001, 0.001, 0.002 for the three war
scenarios, respectively. Continuous lines correspond to selected single runs of the model, while the shading
indicates the density of S over an ensemble of 104 realizations.
and weights them by the maturity of the editor. This process can actually be repeated for
the model: The editor maturity Ti is then deﬁned as the number of time steps an agent
has been in the pool of editors (a quantity constantly reset by agent replacement), and a
conﬂict event is considered as the time an editor modiﬁes the article, since this implies
the agent is not satisﬁed with the state of the medium.
Thus a theoretical counterpart S to the WP controversy measure M may be deﬁned as
follows: Let S =  at the beginning of the dynamics. Then in each update t∗ (out of the N
that constitute a time step in the dynamics), when editor i changes the state of the article
by the amount  = |A(t∗ + ) –A(t∗)| we increment S by Ti, where Ti measures the time
i has been in the editorial pool. Examples of the temporal evolution of S (lower row in
Figure ) closely reproduce the qualitative behavior of M for diﬀerent war scenarios. To
further compare empirical observations in WP with our model predictions, we measure
the typical length of a constant ‘plateau’ in the M and S time series, i.e. the number of
edits between two successive increments. As seen in the distribution of plateau length
for WP and the model (Figure ), a statistical agreement for all three war scenarios is
clear.
A last word on WP banning statistics. A way of estimating the number of extremists is
to count the number of editors who have been ‘banned’ from editing. Explicitly, “a ban is a
formal prohibition from editing some or all WP pages, either temporarily or indeﬁnitely”
[]. Usually banning is used against vandals and/or editors who violate WP policies, es-
pecially those related to edit wars. In Table  we give some statistics of editors at diﬀerent
classes of editing activity, according to their number of edits. Interestingly, the relative
population of banned editors is larger among more experienced editors (i.e. editors with
more than  edits). In other words, up to almost % of experienced editors could have
been involved in edit wars. This is in complete accord with the choices we have made for
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Figure 9 Peace periods in WP and our model.
Distribution of plateau lengths for selected articles in
WP (squares) and tuned parameters in our model
(lines) for the three war scenarios shown in Figure 8.
The length of a plateau or peace period is deﬁned as
the number of edits between two successive
increments in either M or S.
the modeling setup, namely having two active extremist groups with roughly % of the
total number of editors.
4 Discussion and conclusion
Here we have studied through modeling the emergence, persistence and resolution of
conﬂicts in a collaborative environment of humans such as WP. The value production
process takes place through interaction between peers (editors for WP) and through di-
rect modiﬁcation of the product or medium (an article). While in most cases this pro-
cess is constructive and peaceful, from time to time severe conﬂicts emerge. We modeled
the dynamics of conﬂicts during collaboration by coupling opinion formation with article
editing in a generalized bounded-conﬁdence dynamics. The simple addition of a common
value-production process leads to the replacement of frozen opinion groups (typical of the
bounded-conﬁdence dynamics)with a global consensus and a tunable relaxation time. The
model with a ﬁxed pool shows a rich phase diagram with several characteristic behaviors:
(a) an extremely long relaxation time, (b) fast relaxation preceded by oscillating behavior
of the medium opinion, and (c) an even faster relaxation with an erratic medium.We have
observed a symmetry-breaking, bifurcation transition between regimes (a) and (b), as well
as divergence of the relaxation time in the transition between regimes (b) and (c).
If the pool is not ﬁxed and editors are exchanged with new ones at a given rate, we
obtain two diﬀerent phases: conﬂict and peace. A conﬂict measure can be deﬁned for the
modeled systemandbe directly compared to its empirical counterpart in realWPdata. It is
then possible to follow the temporal evolution of this measure of controversy and obtain
a good qualitative agreement with the empirical observations. These results lead us to
plausible explanations for the spontaneous emergence of currentWP policies, introduced
to moderate or resolve conﬂicts.
Two remarks are at place here. In this study we have used a particular collaboration
environment and compared our results with WP. The main reason behind is that for the
free encyclopedia we have a full documentation of actions; however, we should emphasize
that as web-based collaborative environments are abundant, we believe that our approach
and results are much more general. Second, we are aware of the fact that the model con-
tains a number of stringent simpliﬁcations: There are cultural diﬀerences between the
WPs (e.g., in the usage of the talk page), and as in all human-related features there are
large inhomogeneities in the opinions, in the tolerance level and in the activity of editors.
Some of these aspects are under current study and will be taken into account for future
research.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Iñiguez et al. EPJ Data Science 2014, 2014:7 Page 19 of 20
http://www.epjdatascience.com/content/2014/1/7
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
All authors designed the research and participated in the writing of the manuscript. GI and JT contributed equally to this
work. GI and JT performed the numerical calculations and analytical approximations. TY analyzed the empirical data.
Author details
1Department of Biomedical Engineering and Computational Science, Aalto University School of Science, Aalto, FI-00076,
Finland. 2Institute of Physics, Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Budapest, H-1111, Hungary. 3Oxford
Internet Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3JS, United Kingdom. 4Center for Network Science, Central European
University, Budapest, H-1051, Hungary.
Acknowledgements
The authors acknowledge support from the ICTeCollective EU FP7 project. JK thanks FiDiPro (TEKES) and the DATASIM EU
FP7 project for support. JT thanks the support of European Union and the European Social Fund through project
FuturICT.hu (grant no.: TAMOP-4.2.2.C-11/1/KONV-2012-0013).
Received: 17 March 2014 Accepted: 18 July 2014
References
1. Axelrod R, Hamilton WD (1981) The evolution of cooperation. Science 211(4489):1390
2. Schelling TC (1980) The strategy of conﬂict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
3. Ratnieks FLW, Foster KR, Wenseleers T (2006) Conﬂict resolution in insect societies. Annu Rev Entomol 51(1):581-608
4. de Waal FBM (2000) Primates—a natural heritage of conﬂict resolution. Science 289(5479):586-590
5. Flack JC, Girvan M, de Waal FBM, Krakauer DC (2006) Policing stabilizes construction of social niches in primates.
Nature 439(7075):426-429
6. Melis AP, Semmann D (2010) How is human cooperation diﬀerent? Philos Trans R Soc B 365(1553):2663-2674
7. Rand DG, Arbesman S, Christakis NA (2011) Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with
humans. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 108(48):19193-19198
8. Quirk PJ (1989) The cooperative resolution of policy conﬂict. Am Polit Sci Rev 83(3):905-921
9. Buchan NR, Grimalda G, Wilson R, Brewer M, Fatas E, Foddy M (2009) Globalization and human cooperation. Proc Natl
Acad Sci USA 106(11):4138
10. Lerner J, Tirole J (2002) Some simple economics of open source. J Ind Econ 50(2):197-234
11. Rogers D, Lingard L, Boehler ML, Espin S, Klingensmith M, Mellinger JD, Schindler N (2011) Teaching operating room
conﬂict management to surgeons: clarifying the optimal approach. Med Educ 45(9):939-945
12. Minson JA, Liberman V, Ross L (2011) Two to tango: eﬀects of collaboration and disagreement on dyadic judgment.
Pers Soc Psychol Bull 37(10):1325-1338
13. Castellano C, Fortunato S, Loreto V (2009) Statistical physics of social dynamics. Rev Mod Phys 81(2):591-646
14. Helbing D (2010) Quantitative sociodynamics: stochastic methods and models of social interaction processes, 2nd
edn. Springer, Berlin
15. Onnela J-P, Saramäki J, Hyvönen J, Szabó G, Lazer D, Kaski K, Kertész J, Barabási A-L (2007) Structure and tie strengths
in mobile communication networks. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 104(18):7332-7336
16. Ratkiewicz J, Fortunato S, Flammini A, Menczer F, Vespignani A (2010) Characterizing and modeling the dynamics of
online popularity. Phys Rev Lett 105(15):158701
17. Yasseri T, Kertész J (2013) Value production in a collaborative environment. J Stat Phys 151(3-4):414-439
18. Mestyán M, Yasseri T, Kertész J (2013) Early prediction of movie box oﬃce success based on Wikipedia activity big
data. PLoS ONE 8(8):e71226
19. Ciampaglia G (2011) A bounded conﬁdence approach to understanding user participation in peer production
systems. In: Datta A et al (eds) Social informatics. Lecture notes in computer science, vol 6984. Springer, Berlin,
pp 269-282
20. Yasseri T, Sumi R, Rung A, Kornai A, Kertész J (2012) Dynamics of conﬂicts in Wikipedia. PLoS ONE 7(6):e38869
21. Yasseri T, Sumi R, Kertész J (2012) Circadian patterns of Wikipedia editorial activity: a demographic analysis. PLoS ONE
7(1):e30091
22. Kollock P (1998) Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation. Annu Rev Sociol 24(1):183-214
23. Jensen C, Farnham SD, Drucker SM, Kollock P (2000) The eﬀect of communication modality on cooperation in online
environments. In: Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors in computing systems. CHI’00. ACM, New
York, pp 470-477
24. Wikipedia: Talk page guidelines. Retrieved Feb 23, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Talk_page_
guidelines
25. Wikipedia: Using talk pages. Retrieved Feb 23, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Using_talk_pages
26. Kaltenbrunner A, Laniado D (2012) There is no deadline: time evolution of Wikipedia discussions. In: Proceedings of
the eighth annual international symposium on Wikis and open collaboration. WikiSym’12. ACM, New York
27. Deﬀuant G, Neau D, Amblard F, Weisbuch G (2000) Mixing beliefs among interacting agents. Adv Complex Syst
3(4):87-98
28. Török J, Iñiguez G, Yasseri T, San Miguel M, Kaski K, Kertész J (2013) Opinions, conﬂicts, and consensus: modeling
social dynamics in a collaborative environment. Phys Rev Lett 110(8):088701
29. Wikipedia: Liancourt Rocks dispute. Retrieved May 21, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liancourt_Rocks_
dispute
30. Axelrod R (1997) The dissemination of culture. A model with local convergence and global polarization. J Conﬂ
Resolut 41(2):203-226
31. Lorenz J (2007) Continuous opinion dynamics under bounded conﬁdence: a survey. Int J Mod Phys C
18(12):1819-1838
Iñiguez et al. EPJ Data Science 2014, 2014:7 Page 20 of 20
http://www.epjdatascience.com/content/2014/1/7
32. Sznajd-Weron K, Sznajd J (2005) Who is left, who is right? Physica A 351(2):593-604
33. Wojcieszak M, Price V (2009) What underlies the false consensus eﬀect? How personal opinion and disagreement
aﬀect perception of public opinion. Int J Public Opin Res 21(1):25-46
34. Morrison KR, Matthes J (2011) Socially motivated projection: need to belong increases perceived opinion consensus
on important issues. Eur J Soc Psychol 41(6):707-719
35. Weisbuch G, Deﬀuant G, Amblard F, Nadal J-P (2002) Meet, discuss, and segregate! Complexity 7(3):55-63
36. Ben-Naim E, Krapivsky PL (2000) Multiscaling in inelastic collisions. Phys Rev E 61(1):R5-R8
37. Baldassarri A, Marini Bettolo Marconi U, Puglisi A (2002) Inﬂuence of correlations on the velocity statistics of scalar
granular gases. Europhys Lett 58:14
38. Ben-Naim E, Krapivsky PL, Redner S (2003) Bifurcations and patterns in compromise processes. Physica D
183(3-4):190-204
39. Laguna MF, Abramson G, Zanette DH (2004) Minorities in a model for opinion formation. Complexity 9(4):31-36
40. Porﬁri M, Bollt EM, Stilwell DJ (2007) Decline of minorities in stubborn societies. Eur Phys J B 57(4):481-486
41. Hegselmann R, Krause U (2002) Opinion dynamics and bounded conﬁdence models, analysis, and simulation. J Artif
Soc Soc Simul 5(3):2
42. Fortunato S, Latora V, Pluchino A, Rapisarda A (2005) Vector opinion dynamics in a bounded conﬁdence consensus
model. Int J Mod Phys C 16(10):1535-1551
43. Jacobmeier D (2005) Multidimensional consensus model on a Barabási-Albert network. Int J Mod Phys C
16(4):633-646
44. Lorenz J (2008) Fostering consensus in multidimensional continuous opinion dynamics under bounded conﬁdence.
In: Managing complexity: insights, concepts, applications. Springer, Berlin, pp 321-334
45. González-Avella JC, Cosenza MG, Eguíluz VM, San Miguel M (2010) Spontaneous ordering against an external ﬁeld in
non-equilibrium systems. New J Phys 12:013010
46. Lorenz J (2010) Heterogeneous bounds of conﬁdence: meet, discuss and ﬁnd consensus! Complexity 15(4):43-52
47. Kimmons R (2011) Understanding collaboration in Wikipedia. First Monday 16:12
48. Wikipedia: Edit warring. Retrieved Feb 23, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Edit_warring
49. Sumi R, Yasseri T, Rung A, Kornai A, Kertész J (2011) Edit wars in Wikipedia. In: 2011 IEEE third international conference
on privacy, security, risk and trust (PASSAT) and 2011 IEEE third international conference on social computing
(SocialCom), pp 724-727
50. Sepehri Rad H, Makazhanov A, Raﬁei D, Barbosa D (2012) Leveraging editor collaboration patterns in Wikipedia. In:
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM conference on hypertext and social media. HT’12. ACM, New York, pp 13-22
51. Rivest RL (1992) The MD5 message-digest algorithm. Internet Request for Comments, RFC 1321
52. Halfaker A, Kittur A, Riedl J (2011) Don’t bite the newbies: how reverts aﬀect the quantity and quality of Wikipedia
work. In: Proceedings of the 7th international symposium on Wikis and open collaboration. WikiSym’11. ACM, New
York, pp 163-172
53. Yasseri T, Spoerri A, Graham M, Kertész J (2014) The most controversial topics in Wikipedia: a multilingual and
geographical analysis. In: Fichman P, Hara N (eds) Global Wikipedia: international and cross-cultural issues in online
collaboration. Scarecrow Press, Lanham
54. Wikipedia: Banning policy. Retrieved Feb 23, 2014, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Banning_policy
doi:10.1140/epjds/s13688-014-0007-z
Cite this article as: Iñiguez et al.:Modeling social dynamics in a collaborative environment. EPJ Data Science 2014
2014:7.
